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I. Population Aging
In the United States and many other coun-
tries populations will age at rapid rates over 
the next few decades. Population aging results 
from longer life, lower fertility, and initial age 
distributions.
Rising US life expectancy has added years 
of life not only in old age but also in the cur-
rent working ages of 20 to 65. The Trustees 
Report (2011) projected life expectancy to 
rise to 82.2 years in 2050, but the National 
Research Council’s Committee on the Long-
Run Macroeconomic Effects of the Aging US 
Population projected it to rise to 84.5 by 2050, 
in line with various other studies. In 1950 peo-
ple spent 15 percent of total expected life years 
in retirement; in 2010 that had risen to 19 per-
cent; by 2050 it is projected to rise to 24 per-
cent (combining TR 2011 with our demographic 
projections).
A natural response to lengthening life might 
be a parallel extension of working life. However, 
much of population aging is due to low fertil-
ity and inherited age distributions including the 
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massive US baby boom, and these also require 
adjustments.
Fertility in the United States has been 2.0 to 
2.1 births per woman in recent decades, close 
to  replacement level, although it declined in 
the Great Recession to below 1.9 by 2012 (Hamilton, Martin, and Ventura 2013).
Most rich nations have had substantially 
lower fertility, averaging around 1.4 to 1.5, more 
than a half child lower than the United States. 
Furthermore, the United States had a massive 
baby boom after World War II. Primarily for 
these reasons the US population has been rela-
tively young among the industrial nations, and 
although it will age rapidly in coming decades, 
it will remain relatively young. Nonetheless, the 
proportion age 65 and over in the United States 
rose from 8 percent in 1950 to 13 percent in 2010 
and is expected to rise above 20 percent by 2030 
as the baby boom moves into old age. The Old 
Age Dependency Ratio (OADR, ratio of popula-
tion age 65 and above to age 20 to 64) is pro-
jected to rise from 0.22 in 2010 to 0.39 in 2050.
The past increase in the population share of 
the elderly has been accompanied by a striking 
increase in consumption by the elderly com-
pared to consumption by younger adults. The 
ratio of consumption in the early 80s to the early 
20s approximately doubled between 1960 and 
2007 (NRC, 2012:48), raising the cost of past 
and projected population aging.
The Weighted Support Ratio (WSR) is per-
haps a better indicator than the OADR of the 
macroeconomic impact of population aging. It is 
based on age profiles of consumption and labor 
income in a base period. The support ratio in a 
given year is the ratio of the population age dis-
tribution in that year multiplied times that base 
year age profile of labor income and divided by 
a similar product sum for consumption (Cutler 
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et al. 1990). The Report projects the WSR to 
decline by 12 percent between 2010 and 2050, 
or by 0.3 percent per year, close to Cutler et al. (1990). Due to population aging, consumption 
will rise 0.3 percent more slowly than otherwise.
What would it take to reduce the OADR in 
2050 by 10 percent from 0.39 to 0.35? This 
would require an increase in fertility each year 
between now and then by 0.5 births, or an 
increase in net immigration by almost one mil-
lion each year.
Might projected population aging fail to 
materialize in the coming decades? Probabilistic 
projections by the Committee indicate this is 
exceedingly unlikely.
A. Health and Disability
Population aging has very different impli-
cations depending on whether older people 
are largely vigorous and independent or are 
frail, disabled, and in need of care. Increased 
life expectancy has very different implications 
depending on the quality of the added years. In 
fact, disability does rise strongly with age, but 
at older ages it declined steadily in the 1980s 
and 1990s (NRC 2012). Disability is strongly 
inversely associated with level of education, 
and the higher educational attainment of more 
recent cohorts of elderly has contributed to the 
declining trend of disability. Increasing health 
and functional status at older ages has led to 
sayings such as “70 is the new 60.” In fact the 
self-reported health of 60-year-old men in the 
1970s was about the same as for 69-year-olds 
in the 2000s (NRC 2012:90).
Unfortunately, a number of studies have 
found that this favorable trend for the elderly 
stopped around 2000 except for those over 85. 
Furthermore, in some studies the nearly old (40–64) have rising rates of ill health and dis-
ability, due to diabetes and obesity, although in 
other studies the trend is flat. These recent trends 
in disability and ill health are very troubling as 
the population ages.
The Committee developed its own projec-
tions of the ability of the population to supply 
labor through 2050 based on projected changes 
in age, race/ethnicity, and education in rela-
tion to measures of health such as obesity, can-
cer, heart disease, stroke, and major and minor 
health impairments. The conclusion was that 
there would be very little change in the propor-
tion of the population age 20–74 that could hypo-
thetically supply labor between 2010 and 2050. 
Individual decisions and public policies may lead 
to a flat age at retirement in coming decades, but 
this will not be dictated by health and biology.
In light of the trends discussed above the 
Committee suggests age 65 is an obsolete bound-
ary for defining old age and that the OADR is 
a misleading measure. Alternate measures can 
be based on functional status (Sanderson and 
Scherbov 2010).
B. Aging and the Labor Force
The macroeconomic consequences of popu-
lation aging will depend in part on how long 
people choose to work in the future. Higher 
labor supply at older ages would mean less lei-
sure for the elderly and might be difficult for 
some in manual occupations. However, it would 
also mean that fewer resources would need to 
be transferred to the elderly by younger work-
ers and that the older workers would pay taxes 
that would help pay the higher costs for Social 
Security, Medicare, and Medicaid.
Between 1950 and 2010 labor force participa-
tion rates (LFP) for men 25–54 declined gradu-
ally, while they declined rapidly for men 55 and 
over until 1995 as age at retirement dropped. But 
after 1995 LFP above age 55 rose significantly, 
and men’s age at retirement likewise rose by 1.5 to 
2 years through 2010. Trends for women are more 
complicated by their rising LFP, but since 1995 
their mean age at retirement has also risen by 1.5 
years. Although changes in fertility and mortality 
have certainly contributed to the changing age dis-
tribution of the labor force, rising rates of immi-
gration and female LFP have also contributed.
The Committee’s projections indicate that the 
labor force growth rate will vary between 0.5 and 
0.6 percent per year through 2050, down very 
substantially from the preceding 60 years. The 
mean age of the labor force has risen from 35 in 
1980 to 40 in 2010, and the Committee’s projec-
tions indicate it will rise to 42 by 2040, while the 
share of prime age (25–54) workers will decline 
from 66 percent in 2010 to 61 percent in 2050. 
The share of older workers (55+) will more than 
double from 12 percent in 1990 to 24 percent in 
2020, and 27 percent in 2050. The White Non-
Hispanic share of the labor force will decline 
from two thirds in 2010 to a half in 2050.
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Although the population and labor force will 
be aging, while ill health and disability rise 
strongly with age, nonetheless the capacity to 
work of the population age 20–74 will barely 
change over the next 40 years, declining from 91 
to 89 percent, assuming no change in the propor-
tion of the population with a given characteristic (e.g., educational attainment) that is disabled. 
There is very substantial room for increased 
labor supply at older ages.
The structure of public pension incentives 
has an important influence on retirement behav-
ior, as has been demonstrated in cross-national 
studies (Gruber and Wise 1998). In the United 
States both Social Security and private Defined 
Benefit (DB) plans contain incentives for early 
retirement (e.g., after 35 years of work and con-
tributions, further contributions have little or no 
effect on benefit levels, and treating Medicare as 
secondary insurer for older employees reduces 
their net value to employers). The ongoing 
switch from private DB to Defined Contribution (DC) pensions has reduced these incentives but 
not those in Social Security.
Would postponed retirement take jobs from 
the young? Under conditions of high unemploy-
ment this could happen, but over the longer term 
the economy has demonstrated its capacity to 
absorb tens of millions of new female workers 
and immigrant workers without causing unem-
ployment. Comparative work by the Gruber-
Wise project found no evidence that reducing 
the employment of older workers generated 
employment opportunities for the young, nor 
that raising the employment of older workers 
reduced the opportunities for the young.
There are various changes that would facili-
tate longer work. DB plans do not need to con-
tain distortionary incentives, and these could be 
eliminated, including those in Social Security 
and Medicare. More flexible work hours and 
allowance for gradual retirement would make 
it easier for older workers to continue working. 
Retraining and continuing education of older 
workers may be useful, but the efficacy of such 
programs is unknown.
C. Innovation, Productivity,  
and Population Aging
Even a small effect of population aging on 
the rate of productivity growth would eventu-
ally dominate other effects of aging. There is 
considerable research on how individual perfor-
mance in various domains varies with age, but 
its relevance for productivity in the work force 
is not clear, particularly since work is often done 
in teams. The Committee concluded it would be 
best to rely on market-based measures of pro-
ductivity such as wages or aggregate produc-
tivity. The Committee estimated earnings by 
experience curves for males by education with 
year dummies. Combining these estimates with 
projected age distributions of the labor force 
from 2010 to 2030, the Committee found that 
effects on productivity would be negligible.
The Committee also considered the small lit-
erature on the relation of aggregate age distribu-
tion to productivity growth, reestimated some key 
equations, and concluded that estimates are frag-
ile and that any effects appear to be very small.
The Committee also considered innovations 
by age, where innovations are measured by pat-
ents or by the work for which the Nobel Prize is 
subsequently granted, or for great technological 
innovators, with a peak at age 39. But while age 
does appear to be an important influence on indi-
vidual innovation, it does not explain variation 
across countries.
One concern is that population aging and post-
poned retirement may constrict the resources 
made available to younger scientists and in that 
way impede innovation. Besides this concern, 
however, it did not appear that population aging 
would lead to slower productivity growth.
D. Saving and Retirement Security
Population aging may affect national saving 
rates in various ways—perhaps leading to public 
sector dissaving due to pressure on public pen-
sions and health care, and by altering the rela-
tive numbers of individuals at different ages who 
may have different saving behavior, for exam-
ple. But individuals might also raise their saving 
and asset accumulation once they become aware 
of the long-term budgetary problems of govern-
ment transfer programs, and of their increasing 
life expectancies. The literature on these points 
is not conclusive.
Another question is the extent to which indi-
vidual and household savings and asset holdings 
are adequate to support consumption in retire-
ment in the context of other public and private 
pensions and health care. Estimates of the share 
of older people with inadequate savings or 
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asset holdings range from a fifth to two-thirds. 
This wide spread reflects different definitions 
of adequacy, of the population considered, and 
of methods used. All these studies assume that 
scheduled public and private benefits will be 
forthcoming in the future.
However, projected population aging is 
already straining public pensions and health 
care systems, and it is likely that this will lead to 
restructuring that may include reduced benefits 
or increased taxes in the future. Many private 
pension programs are underfunded, and health 
care assistance for retirees is being cut back. 
Such future changes would worsen the adequacy 
status of many people and households in those 
studies.
There is great heterogeneity in preparedness 
for retirement. Lower income people have very 
few assets, but given the higher Social Security 
replacement rates at low incomes, asset income 
is less necessary for maintaining consumption 
levels, yet low assets leave households vulner-
able to shocks and to possible adjustments to 
future benefit levels.
A variety of policy options might improve 
retirement income security. One is to broaden 
access to employment based retirement saving 
programs. Another is to encourage later retire-
ment, giving workers more time to prepare for a 
shorter retirement. Improving reverse mortgages 
would give older people better access to an 
important asset. New forms of insurance against 
the risks of longevity, need for long-term care, 
inflation, and asset price fluctuations could also 
be valuable. Improved financial literacy through 
education and training has also been shown to 
be helpful. And putting both public and private 
pension and health insurance programs on a 
secure and sustainable basis is fundamentally 
important.
E. Will Population Aging Depress 
Rates of Return?
The rate of return on assets is of obvious 
importance for the incomes of retirees, particu-
larly as defined benefit plans become rare. Will 
population aging and the retirement of the baby 
boom cause a collapse of asset prices and rates 
of return?
First, it is important to realize that capi-
tal markets are global, and the changing age 
distribution of the United States is of limited 
importance. However, the global population 
is also aging. The OADR of the United States 
population is projected to remain substantially 
higher than the OADR of the global population 
through 2050, but when we weight each coun-
try’s population by its projected per capita GDP, 
the US and global OADRs are very similar in 
2010 and 2050, while the US OADR is higher 
in between (NRC 2012:157). These global 
trends will strongly influence the level of wages, 
capital labor ratios, and rates of return in the 
United States. The differing levels and timing of 
aging across countries and regions may induce 
flows of capital from the older countries to the 
younger ones, although many other factors are 
also at play, as the example of China illustrates.
Population aging in the United States is likely 
to raise private asset holding per capita and per 
worker. First, net worth rises strongly with age 
of household head. If that pattern persists, then 
higher proportions of the population in the older 
ages will raise assets per worker in a mechanical 
way, by about 20 percent by 2050. To the extent 
that workers and retirees realize that the longev-
ity is rising they may save more or dissave less.
At the same time that population aging may 
raise private asset holdings, it may also raise 
public debt through pressure on the budgets 
of public pensions, health care, and long-term 
care. For this reason, the net effect of population 
aging on asset holdings in the United States is 
unclear.
If global population aging does cause an 
increase in asset intensity this would not be 
expected to cause any sudden change in asset 
returns or prices because population aging is 
very slow and predictable with no surprises for 
investors. Simulations of the effect of popula-
tion aging on asset returns, with some assum-
ing international capital flows, indicate a small 
decline in rates of return, by 0.3 percent to 
1 percent in coming decades. Other simulations 
produce conflicting conclusions on whether 
population aging will increase or decrease the 
size of the equity premium. Empirical studies 
likewise yield conflicting conclusions about 
equity returns and prices.
Even if the asset intensity increases as popu-
lations age, it is possible that increasing invest-
ments in education will to some degree substitute 
quality and productivity of labor for numbers of 
workers, tending to prevent an increase in capi-
tal labor ratios.
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Housing prices are important for the elderly. 
Because the US population is expected to 
continue to grow, unlike in many other rich 
 countries, it is not expected that population 
aging will cause a general decline in housing 
prices. However, there are likely to be substan-
tial regional variations.
F. Population Aging and Fiscal Outlook
As noted earlier, the weighted support ratio 
is projected to decline by 12 percent between 
2010 and 2050. However, that understates the 
budgetary pressures of population aging on spe-
cific government programs for the elderly, such 
as Social Security, Medicare, or the institutional 
portion of Medicaid that pays long-term care 
costs for some elderly. Government programs 
finance a sizable proportion of consumption by 
the elderly, so population aging will stress the 
budgets of these programs and contribute to the 
overall government deficit.
Macroeconomic adjustment to population 
aging will require some combination of lower 
consumption (through increased saving or 
higher taxes) and increased labor supply, per-
haps through later retirement. The public sec-
tor funds a large share of consumption in old 
age through programs such as Social Security 
and Medicare, so population aging strongly 
impacts the public sector. At the same time, it 
is through public policies that government can 
influence consumption by workers and by older 
age groups, and affect age at retirement and the 
demand for older workers. Furthermore, gov-
ernment programs will largely determine which 
ages and which generations bear the costs of 
population aging. For example, the same fiscal 
adjustment could be achieved by cutting Social 
Security benefits or by raising payroll taxes with 
very different effects on workers versus retir-
ees and earlier versus later born generations. 
Similarly, policies could have very different 
impacts on higher and lower income individuals 
within a generation.
The long-term fiscal imbalance in the United 
States is well known, and population aging is an 
important driver of that imbalance. However, it 
would be very difficult to isolate the role of pop-
ulation aging because that would require evalu-
ation of a counterfactual in which government 
programs might also have differed had fertility 
remained higher and longevity not increased.
Most analysts believe that the biggest prob-
lem is the increase in costs of publicly provided 
health care, but the future trajectory of cost 
growth is murky. There has been a striking slow-
down in rate of excess cost growth (growth of 
age-adjusted health spending minus growth of 
GDP), but it is not known to what extent this 
reflects the recession, the new Affordable Care 
Act, or other factors such as more plans with 
higher deductibles (Chandra, Holmes, and 
Skinner 2013). Official federal projections of 
health costs reflect this uncertainty.
Population aging is expected to be ongoing. 
It will be particularly rapid over the next three 
decades and continue thereafter at a slower 
pace as mortality continues to fall. If the gov-
ernment were to try to smooth its impact across 
the generations, that would require building 
up a substantial fund, the income from which 
could help to fund the costs of the older popu-
lation. A different approach would be to set a 
goal such as keeping the debt-to-GDP ratio in 
2050 equal to its current value. The Committee, 
drawing on Auerbach and Gale (2012), found 
that under optimistic and pessimistic assump-
tions an adjustment that is implemented in 2012 
would have to be between 1.1 and 4.8 percent of 
GDP annually, and if delayed until 2032 would 
have to be between 2.2 and 7.7 percent (NRC 
2012:187). This calculation also shows the cost 
of postponing action. Auerbach and Gale (2013) 
presents rather different estimates.
II. Conclusion
Population aging poses serious challenges, but 
these are not insurmountable, and they appear 
smaller than those faced by most other rich 
nations. There are many possible policy responses 
to improve the fiscal stability of government pro-
grams, encourage increased labor supply, and 
encourage private savings. At the same time 
policy should be alert to which ages, generations, 
and socioeconomic groups bear the costs of pro-
posed adjustments, and to the effects of adjust-
ments on incentives and efficiency. If adjustments 
are postponed they will have to be larger.
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